THE INTERNATIONAL WORKING GROUP ON THE DOHA AGENDA
(IWOGDA) PROGRAMME
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Application
of WTO Core Principles of Competition |
Introduction
It
is well recognised that varying economic social and cultural needs and
interests influence and separate national systems of competition law
(Ulrich, 1998)[1].
That competition policy cannot be identical in different countries
and each market needs to be assessed in its own context (Britain and Van
Merit, 1996).[2]
Differences in competition policies are therefore significant and
often reflect themselves in the gaols of competition laws.
There is perceived to be a broad consensus amongst WTO members that
the basic goal of competition policy is to enhance inter-firm rivalry in
private markets, to deal with anticompetitive government measures so as to
promote economic efficiency, consumer welfare and economic development.
Governments differ however, on weather and to what extent
non-efficiency goals (such as fairness, opportunities of small business,
market integration, pluralism, technological development) should be taken
into account in the conduct of competition policy.
The WTO principles of non-discrimination (national treatment, most
favoured nation) transparency and procedural fairness reinforces the
competition law objective of protecting the competitive process without
regard to the nationality of the competitors, however, it is argued that
there is a need to clarify and adapt the non-discrimination principles with
regard to competition laws and policies for developing and lesser developed
countries.
Multilateral
negotiation on competition policy by developing countries has been a slow
and deliberate process. These countries appear to be uncertain if not
insecure about the costs benefits of new disciplines in this area, although
many support the general concept of the application of binding international
rules to curb restrictive trade practices.
The differences in the approach, goals and implementation of
competition policies in developed countries however, suggest that national
needs and objectives rather than international considerations are decisive
issues.
WTO and Competition
Policy
Given
the different conceptions and objectives with which developed and developing
countries have approached exploratory negotiations
on competition policy, the outcome of the exercise has been unpredictable.
In the present context, developing countries have a lot of freedom to
design and implement their competition policies, unrestricted by
international rules and to some extent so far free from demands or coercion
by developed countries. There
is no obvious urgency on their part to move forward the agenda for a
multilateral competition regime.
The
EU appears as the leading force behind the proposal to develop disciplines
on competition in the framework of the WTO; although there is considerable
disagreement amongst some developed countries on the desirability and
possible outcome of such proposal. The EU initiative appears to be driven by
the belief that an effective application of competition policy can keep
markets open and accessible for foreign competitors.
The reaction of developing countries has been one of cautious
observation, adopting a collective position to proceed with care in the
context of the limited domestic reach of competition laws vis-à-vis the
growth of anticompetitive practices by TNCs globally.
Cognisant of the fact that domestic competition policy cannot ensure
that competition will prevail because competition in any territory will be
affected by external actions and decisions (e.g. market strategies of firms
located outside the territory especially in the service industries) over
which the national territorial laws have no jurisdiction.
It
is argued that a multi-lateral framework of competition rules and
cooperation for international trade should be consistent with the general
WTO principles of transparency, non-discrimination, procedural fairness,
cooperation and commitment, supported by enforcement procedures, cooperation
and dispute resolution. These
principles are endorsed in the WTO agreements; GATT, GATS and TRIPS
Agreement[3],
whilst further recognising and specifically addressing the issue of national
circumstances. Proposal for the application of these principles to
competition law and policy has been met with mixed reaction from some of the
developed and many developing Member states of the WTO.
Implications
for Developing Countries
The
uniform application of these principles in the context of the general thrust
and objective of WTO agreements (to provide for market access) would not
only create serious inequities between the developed and developing WTO
Members but would also have the effect of opening up domestic markets of all
Members to other Member states on a non-discriminatory basis and expose
their businesses (importantly, services of the LDC and developing countries)
to competition from the developed countries. .
The ability of home companies to sell products and provide services
in their own home markets is only possible in the long run if their products
and services are competitive with goods from the U.S., EU and Japan (which
is highly unlikely). Application of these principles in relation to
competition in an international context would without specific adjustments,
give the firms of the developed countries an unfair advantage to unlimited
and uncontrolled access to the LDCs’ national market which would harm
their firms development prospects especially the service sectors which
currently makes up 60% of most economies and underscore the concerns of
developing countries and their reaction to the proposals for a multilateral
framework for competition law and policy negotiation.
Competition
authorities in developing countries complain that developing countries
interests are not adequately taken into consideration in the competition
policies of developed industrialised countries and can be substantiated by
numerous examples to date. The
Director General of the WTO, Michael Moore, (a New Zealander) recently
wrote, “It is ironic that it is those sectors that benefit most from the
international trading system continue to work so hard to stay outside the
system and its rules. The aviation and agriculture sectors in particular and
yet they remain largely outside the scope of the WTO rules.
The most global of all industries remain protected contrary to the
WTO agreements principles of non-discrimination and transparency and thus
advance the case for a multilateral framework”. [4]
Private
international anticompetitive practices or monopolisation by global firms of
domestic markets can therefore prevent economic development, or limit its
scope. Failure by developing
countries to have adequate means to fight such practices exposes them to
significant costs and retardation in their processes of economic
development. Developed countries have generally ignored or encouraged export
cartels whose activities deleteriously affect other countries (LDCs and
developing countries in the main). Experience has shown that cooperation of
developed countries in the investigation and discovery of such practices has
been lacking.
Many
developing countries do not have the necessary endowments, national
competition laws or competition policy in place to meet the transparency and
non-discriminatory market access principles and obligations of the WTO
agreements; they lack the ability to engage in market orientated reforms or
to adopt a competition law, being without the instruments to build a
competition culture or develop appropriate institutions.
Real concerns are also expressed that a multilateral framework on
competition policy would impair or limit their development policy options
and ability to implement pro-development industrial policies at their
fledgling stages.
It
is essential therefore, that the effect of WTO principles on the autonomy of
national competition authorities and the interpretation and enforcement of
their laws, should not weaken existing competition safeguards. As stated by Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann,[5]
“There is a need for pragmatic synthesis between narrow “…competition
law approaches” and over ambitious “integration law approaches” so as
to enable WTO Members to move towards progressive competition-orientated
reforms of the world trading system in order to better protect consumer
welfare and the equal rights of citizens”
There
are real issues to be addressed as global economies are not homogenous and
poses serious difficulty to integrate competition rules[6]
. Any serious deliberation must include and address the issues of
non-discrimination requirements that could limit parochial exemption that
unreasonably favour domestic economic activities and impose significant
costs on other countries. A literal and untempered application of MFN and
non-discriminatory treatments would be inequitable and difficult given the
vast differences in development amongst WTO Member countries. The WTO
principles, could fulfil the competition law objective of protecting the
competitive process without regard for nationality of the competitor in an
integrated approach as proffered by Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann,[7]
whilst providing for pragmatic synthesis between narrow competition law
approaches and over ambitious integrated law approach as stated by Frederic
Jenny[8].
. In the
final analysis and in the context of a statement issued in the 1997 WTO
Annual Report “The issue is not weather competition policy issues will be
dealt with in the WTO context, but how and in particular, how coherent will
the framework be within which this is to be done”. [9]
Core
Requirements of New Agreement
Adoption of a multilateral competition framework reflecting the core principles of WTO would need to deal with the following issues in order to address the concerns of developing countries:
General consensus and acceptance of core principles of competition at the international level integrated into a cooperation agreements with different commitments and conditionality for its implementation, corresponding to the development and cultural regimes of each country; allowing for the different levels of resources and institutional endowments; as members are characterised by extensive diversity of economic development, socio-economic circumstances, laws, cultural norms and history.
Commitment to the process with suitable modulation of treatment through negotiated transitional periods and requirements for each subgroup, depending upon the Member’s state of development and legal and institutional endowment. . These should not be abused for protectionist reasons.
Establish sub-groupings into Developed - with functional law and institutions, Developing - with operative competition regime, policy, legislation and agencies and Lesser Developed Countries with limited or no competition institutional endowment.
Clarify and adapt the non-discrimination principles of WTO law with regards to competition law and policies as a safeguard for LDC and developing countries and I so doing provide for special and differential treatment through flexibility, appropriate exemptions, exceptions, and waivers so as to reflect the specificity of national competition policy and law; to provide temporary relief from competition to domestic manufacturers and service providers to address the concerns of LDCs and developing country Members; to enable them to achieve their development objectives, with binding realistic timeframes.
Permit realistic exclusions and exemptions and waivers, with timely provisions for elimination or phasing out and measure to ensure transparency of such exclusions, exemptions or waiver.
Promote bilateral and multilateral cooperation on competition matters, exchange of information, assistance in the formulation and introduction of competition policy, laws and institution and capacity building for LDCs and developing countries.
·
The MFN treatment can be problematic but Governments can chose to
negotiate commitments in a various ways as provided in the GATS and TRIPS
Agreements.
Conclusion
Negotiated temporary respite should be permitted, suitable to address the cases of those countries without national regimes or those that need to make the necessary national adjustments to be in a position to access and apply the negotiated competition commitments in an agreed time framework, to facilitate market access by a gradual process. Allowance should be made for differences in national legislation provided they are not contradictory or conflict with the underlying consensus expressed in the WTO principles whilst accepting the reality that the community of trading nations is very diverse with different cultural norms.
It
should be accepted that there are differences in the levels of economic
development amongst the Members and that not all Members are immediately and
equally able to provide or access the benefits of a multilateral
international competition regime applied in the context of the WTO
agreements principles. There should be uniform application of core
principles of competition on a level-playing basis only if national
circumstances are comparable. Limits should be placed upon unfair
protectionists’ exceptions and sectorial exclusions in national
competition laws and policies, and strengthen and extend bilateral
cooperation among competition authorities.
Suggested Wording of Provision
Temporary relief and
negotiated competition commitments in an agreed time framework.
“Each
Member State subscribing to the WTO set of protocols on the Multilateral
Agreement in respect of Competition Law and Policy shall have the right to
apply for temporary relief from international competition to domestic
manufacturers and service providers firms, to address the specific
constraints of that Member State in an attempt to minimise the burden on
Members carrying out any obligations or commitments given.
Temporary relief shall be by way of grant of waiver, exemption or
exclusion to comply with or the application of any commitment required or
given or any provision of the Agreement.
Member shall be granted the opportunity to obtain, such relief with
appropriate flexibility upon mutually agreed terms in respect of the
applicant Member and with respect to the time limit within which such
obligations and commitments given are to be complied with.
All such commitments and or temporary relief granted shall be binding
upon the parties thereto and shall be otherwise subject to the general
provisions of the Agreement.”
[1]
Towards WTO Competition Rules
[2]
Towards WTO Competition Rules
[3] See GATT Article X, GATS Article III and TRIPS Article 63
[4]
The Times August 2 2002
[5] Competition-oriented Reforms of the WTO World Trade System: Proposals and Policy Options.1999
[6]
Report (2002) Working Group On The Interaction Between Trade And
Competition Policy To The General Council
[7]
Competition-oriented Reforms of WTO Trade System – Proposals and
Policy Options
[8]
Globalisation, Competition and Trade Policy: Issues and Challenges.
Towards WTO Competition Rules, 1999
[9]
Report (2002) Working Group On The Interaction Between Trade And
Competition Policy To the General Council.
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Comments on the Paper |
Comments by Gary Horlick
Application of WTO Core Principles--It would be interesting to measure for key developed and developing countries the percentage of those countries trade that operates outside of a given country's own completion law principles--e.g. Agriculture, exports cartels, products subject to antidumping cases
Comments by Peter
Muchlinski
Very much oriented to practicalities and addresses last
point above But I am
not sure what you have in mind by S&D here: there
is interesting work by Hunter Nottage, recently at OECD on
this. I am a little uneasy
about the final proposal. I very much see
what it is aiming at, but I can see huge opposition to
any temporary safeguard exception/opt out. I think that the
whole point of WTO commitments should be to generate
predictability and transparency, so that exemptions are not
banned but are well signaled to economic actors.
I think that for
competition policy any carve would in any case be long rather than short
term. The idea of periodic renegotiations of MFN exemptions might
be feasible. In any case I suspect that there are other
agreements where the need for flexibility is even greater.
Main point – it does not make sense to have a uniform competition
policy for all WTO Members; there are
differences across nations that need to be
accounted for.
However, the main concern here is that this
article provides little or no explicit basis for ignoring
non-discriminatory
competition policies, other than noting that
there are cultural, institutional and other such differences between
countries.
It would be useful to put some content to it.
For instance, the legal institution is an important component of
competition
policy. Quick
remedies are necessary for effective competition law.
However, legal institutions are divergent across
countries, making competition law less
effective in some countries than in others.
Similarly, in a number of countries,
business is conducted through informal
relationships. Competition law in such countries must take this into account
in
considering permissible or non-permissible
cartels. These differences need to be further put in context by
comparing
them with the benefits of an open economic
world market.
CUTS
Centre For International Trade, Economics
& Environment (CITEE)
D–217, Bhaskar Marg, Bani Park, Jaipur 302 016, India, Ph:
+91(0)141-228 2821-3 Fx: +91(0)141-228 2485 Email: cuts@cuts.org/ iwogda@cuts-international.org _________________________________________________________________________________________________ |
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